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Roman Law in American Law: Twentieth Century
Cases of the Supreme Court
Samuel J. Astorino'
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most enduring problems of the legal history of the
West concerns the influence of Roman law on the development and
nature of subsequent legal systems. This article, following very
cursory background remarks, examines cases decided roughly in
the twentieth century by the United States Supreme Court in order
to evaluate the manner, and extent, that that tribunal used Roman
law. Legal historians who have ably chronicled the patterns of
American legal development have almost totally ignored the
presence of Roman doctrines in the jurisprudence of the United
States. That various American lawyers in the past have been well
aware of Roman law, as revealed especially by evidence of their
library holdings, is a story that has come to light through the
recent and remarkable efforts of scholars. That story, nevertheless,
must be complemented by an inquiry into actual applications of
Roman law to American case law. At this point in the research, it
appears to be true that, with some possible exceptions, Roman law
has not furnished the basis of precedent. In those instances where
the ancient rules were employed, they were part of a much broader
historical inquiry that encompassed the English legal heritage
especially as well, but also numerous references to European civil
law, the Napoleonic Code, and to a limited extent the Siete
Partidas.
This last conclusion, however, may provide a slightly different
understanding of the role played by Roman law in influencing
American law. Roman law, together with English common law and
continental civil law, furnished American jurists seeking legal
pedigrees for their decisions with historical understandings. In sum,
Roman law was an integral part of the larger jurisprudential
process by which American jurists reached back to find a line of
1.
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argument to be employed in understanding the case. Unsurprisingly
for common law judges and lawyers who are always tethered to a
sense of history through the process of amassing precedent, a view
of the historical evolution of specific legal rules has been seen as
essential to the determination of the outcome in particular cases.
The effort here is aimed at exploring this very point: it has been
the special sense of a historical background that has brought into
play in American law some aspects of Roman law. That is to say
that if Roman law is isolated in its role, its impact becomes almost
negligible in American legal practice. On the other hand, if its role
is considered in the context of a more inclusive historical analysis
that employed English, canon, and civil laws as well, then Roman
law looms larger as a starting point for an explanatory chain
leading from the past to the present. An examination of the cases
listed herein is designed to elucidate that factual background. As
Roman law has specifically affected jurisprudential thought in
America, the preeminent historian of this topic, Dean Michael
Hoeflich, has concluded that:
There was a moment in the Anglo-American legal world when
Roman and civil law exercised a particular attraction to jurists
and theoreticians. This moment lasted, I suggest, roughly from
the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. 2
By 1920, the "moment" had come to an end in the United States
for two reasons. First, World War I generated a broad anti-German
feeling, thereby closing off a major source of civil law influence.
Second, by the time of the war, there was a dramatic decline in
language skills, especially Greek and Latin, among lawyers and
jurists, amounting to a cultural shift towards the study of the more
technical natural sciences, mathematics, and the social sciences.
The "moment," however, was not totally extinguished after the war,
since echoes of Roman law still lingered in the academic air. Even
as to contemporary times, Dean Hoeflich has still detected a
2.
M H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 142 (1997). Dean Hoeflich entitles his concluding
chapter "The Domestication of Roman Law in the Anglo-American World After 1850." In
further elaboration of his subject, he notes:
The thesis of this bank is quite simple. Although roman and civil law were not
received into Anglo-American law during the modern era, they did in fact exercise a
significant influence on the thinking of some of the most important jurists and legal
theorists of the nineteenth century in the United States and thereby, did indeed pay a
significant role in the development of Anglo-American law and jurisprudence.
Id. at 2.
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Roman law "renaissance" in the American legal academy.3
Interest and advocacy of Roman law in America continued
throughout the twentieth century. The advocacy ran to various
degrees of suggested influence. At one point Charles Phineas
Sherman of Yale condemned the "Ignorance and prejudice"
regarding the "great debt of Anglo-American law to the law of
Rome and the truth that knowledge of Roman law is knowledge of
our own. "4 In 1911, he sharply attacked the case method of
American legal teaching with the provocative declaration that the
study of Roman law "will sooner or later destroy the present
5
emphasis ... as the exclusive method of teaching American law."
Others, like Roscoe Pound, perceived Roman law within the
context of comparative studies or even as gap fillers.6
Americans who were interested in how Roman law affected their
own common law were intently concerned with the background of
England's heritage from Rome. Because of the direct link between
English and American law, they naturally searched backwards to
English law to find that the genesis of Roman influence existed and
then quickly leaped to the obvious assumption that their own law
3. Id. at 142-44; see also M. H. Hoeflich, A Renaissance in Legal History, 1984 U. ILL L
REV. 507, 521 (1984).
4.
CHARLES SHERMAN, RoMAN LAW iN THE MODERN WORLD vol. 18 (2d ed. 1922). Sherman
had taught at Boston University where he founded the Law Review and at Yale where he
was Law Librarian and curator of the Wheeler Collection of Roman, Canon, Continental and
Latin American Law. The lengthy quotation is from his famous work, ROMAN LAW IN THE
MODERN WORLD. The work was reviewed in the Tulane Law Review by Edward A. Bechtel
who saw it as a wider study of Roman law that "will lead to a broader and more scientific
making of law and administration of law in the world today." Edward A. Bechtel, Roman
Law in the Modern World, 5 TuL L REV. 683, 685 (1931) (book review).
5. Id.
The remaining analysis of Sherman derives from his law review articles: The Nineteenth
Century Revival of Roman Law Study in England and America, 23 THE GREEN BAG, 624-26
(1911); Salient Featuresof the Reception of Roman Law Into the Common Law of England
and America, 8 B.U. L REv. 183, 192, (1928); How Greek JurisprudenceHelped to Form Our
Modern Jurisprudence,11 B.U. L REv. 364, 374-75 (1931) (the comparison to the Sermon on
the Mount is reminiscent of W. W. Buckland's claim that next to Christianity, Roman law was
the most important factor in shaping modem civilization). This point was noted by American
writers Hessel E. Yntema, Roman Law and Its Influence on Western Civilization, 35
CORNELL L. REV. 77, 79 (1949) and St. John University Professor Edward D. Re, The Roman
Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L REv. 447, 451 (1961).
6. Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Comparative Law, 5 TuL L REV. 1, 12 (1930), The
Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School Curriculum, 8 TuL L REv. 161
(1934), What May We Expect From Comparative Law, 22 A.BA J. 58 (1936). Pound, of
course, was very critical of a comparative approach that either simply included separate
articles on subjects or that used common law methods to analyze Continental Codes.
"Comparative law of this sort is worse than useless. It belongs in Mr. Dooley's category of
'dislocated law.'" The Place of Comparative Law, at 163.
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necessarily bore the legal imprint of the ancient Romans. A survey
of Volume Three of the Index to Legal Periodicals for 1898-1907, for
example, reveals a surge of articles on this subject.7 The interest
continued throughout the remainder of the century.8
A second source of inspiration was Germany. Here, of course,
the message came in two forms. On the one hand, German legal
scholarship was considered as a mode of Roman methodology in
building a systematic legal structure that derived from historical
analysis that would lead to a legal science. On the other hand,
American legal scholars like Pound saw such "legal science" and
classification as the product of distasteful German metaphysics.
Instead, argued Pound, the works of Rudolph von Jhering and
Eugene Ehrlich were much more suited to the emerging need in
America for a law based on sociological principles and social
engineering. 9 All this was soon badly tainted by the two World
7. Examples include: Samuel Williston, Dependency of Mutual Promises in the Civil
Law, 13 HhAv. L REv. 80 (1890); Samuel Williston, Contracts For the Benefit of a Third
Person, 16 HAav. L REV. 43 (1902); William Wirt Howe, The Community of Acquests and
Gains, 12 YALE LJ. 216 (1903); Joseph H. Drake, Consideration v. Causa in
Roman-American Law, 4 MICH. L REV. 19 (1905); William Wirt Howe, The Study of Roman
and Civil Law, 4 Am.L REV. 46 (1907).
8. A. H. F Lefroy, Rome and Law, 20 HAv. L REV. 606, 617-19 (1907) (Lefroy taught at
the University of Toronto); H. E. Holmes, The Debt of the Common Law to the Civil Law, 6
ME.L REV. 227 (1913); A. Rives Hall, The Common Law - Its Debt to Rome, 5 CAN. B. REV.
639 (1927); Roscoe Pound, The Legal Profession in England From the End of the Middle
Ages to the Nineteenth Century, 19 NOTRE DAME LAw. 315 (1944); William H. Page, Statutes
As Common Law Principles, 1944 Wis. L REv. 175 (1944); Ernst Rabel, Private Laws of
Western Civilization, 10 LA. L REV. 431 (1950); see also the more recent writings: Shael
Herman, Legacy and Legend: the Continuity of Roman and English Regulation of the Jews,
66 TuL L REv. 1781 (1992); Andrew Lewis, What Marcellus Says is Against You: Roman
Law and Common Law, in THE ROMAN LAW TRADITION, 207 ff. (A.D.E. Lewis & D. J. Ibbetson
eds. 1995). Professor Herman, cited above, discussed the debate over whether Roman law
influenced English common law to any significant degree. R. H. Hemholz's CANON LAw AND
THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987) concludes that the contribution was significant, while the classic
Frederick Pollock and Frederic W. Maitland argued that: "As to Roman Law, it led to
nothing." FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, 1 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 122-23
(2d ed. 1899). Peter Stein concludes that in Roman law "We can find much that is relevant
today" as a "basis of comparison" and "providing a stimulus for English jurisprudence."
PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 165
(1988).
9. There is a vast literature on the subject of German influence. See M. F Hoeflich,
TransatlanticFriendships and the German Influence in the First Half of the Nineteenth
Century, 35 An J. Comp. L. 599 (1987). MATmAS REIMANN, THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS
IN THE COMMON LAw WORLD, 1820-1920, published in Berlin in 1993, contains superb surveys of
this subject. See Also MICHELE GRAZIADEI, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAw N XIX CENTURY ENGLISH
LEGAL THOUGHT (THE CONTINENTAL IMPULSE) 115-64; MATHIAS Reimann, A CAREER IN ITSELF - THE
GERMAN PROFESSORIATE AS A MODEL FOR AMERICAN LEGAL ACADEMIA, 165-202; and JOHN HERGET,
THE INFLUENCE OF GERMAN THOUGHT ON AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1880-1918, 202-28 (1990).

2002

Roman Law in American Law

Wars. 10
It can be easily concluded, therefore, that, at the very least,
American interest in Roman law and its particular relationship to
common law theory in the United States stretched from the
eighteenth century through to the present. To the committed, but
small band of American Romanists, the obvious advantages of
ancient rules would benefit immensely their nation's legal system in
many ways. Particularly in its use as a historical tool of
jurisprudence and in the widely held belief that Roman law stood
for universality as trade and commerce embarked upon a more
internationalist trend. In the twentieth century, the names
associated with this group of advocates included scholars who
were famous in their own right as the foremost students of
American law in general: Pound, Samuel Williston, John Henry
Wigmore, John Chipman Gray, James Brown Scott, James T.
Shotwell, Munroe Smith, Hessel Yntema, and others. For one and
all, it was a grave mistake to either ignore or fail to exploit the
teachings of Roman law.
Scholars in the field, of course, know the above story. At the end
of the academic day, however, several questions remain to be
asked. Was Roman law simply an academic subject limited to legal
intellectuals as a matter of theory? Did these debates in America
among scholars touch upon concrete Roman legal doctrines and
their discrete transformations over the centuries and over national
boundaries, including the United States? More importantly, and
most relevant to this article, did American courts actually employ
Also, note the early work of Rudolph Leonhard, Kaiser Wilhelm Professor of Roman Law at
Columbia University, The Vocation of America for the Science of Roman Law, 26 HARv. L
REV. 389-415 (1913).
10. At the time of the First World War, Robert Ludlow Fowler, The New Philosophies
of Law, 27 HnAv. L REV. 718, 723 (1914) attacked German influence. Pound responded that
American law needed "ideas from without." Id. at 732. The Nazi attack on Roman law is
covered by the following: Lawrence Preuss, Germanic Law Versus Roman Law in National
Socialist Legal History, 16 J. Come. LEGAL 269-70, 274 (1934); William J. Dickman, An
Outline of Nazi Civil Law, 15 Miss. LJ. 127, 131 (1943); Detlev Vagts, InternationalLaw in
the Third Reich, 84 Am. J. IN'L L 661, 673-74 (1990). See also Arthur Kaufmtann, National
Socialism and German JurisprudenceFrom 1933 to 1945, 9 CARDozo L REV. 1629-49 (1988);
a companion piece by Mathias Reimann, National Socialist Jurisprudence and Academic
Continuity: A Comment on Professor Kaufmann's Article, 9 CARDozo L REV. 1651-62 (1988);
and Gordon Ireland, Roman and ComparativeLaw in the Americas After the War, 19 TuL L
REV. 553, 554-59 (1945). The American response to Nazi assertion that Roman law was
"unGerman" and "Jewish" came from the Harvard historian C. H. McAlivain, Our Heritage
From the Law of Rome, 19 FOREIGN AFF. 597-99, 600, 605-08 (1941). Realists were discredited
as being too similar to the Nazis in legal discourse, Edward A. Purcell Jr., THE CislS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 176-77, 218-19 (1973).
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Roman law in any of their decisions? Although his reference is to
the nineteenth century, Dean Hoeflich's perceptive question could
be asked of the succeeding years: "Did Roman law have a
widespread influence in the United States at this time? The answer
to this depends on whether or not one believes that high legal
culture can have a major influence on the profession as a whole.
This is not an easy question."11
Legal historians generally have mapped out the influence of
Roman law on modem Western legal thought.1 2 But as Mathias
Reimann recently reminded us, "Americans are not idealists who
seek knowledge pure and simple but pragmatists who want to
accomplish something with it."13 The "lofty and vague" abstractions
of theory are suited for Europeans but not for Americans.' 4 This
sentiment coincides with Dean Hoeflich's definition of "high
culture" as "the nonpractice oriented but professional interests of
the lawyer."15 Thus, R. H. Hemholz notes that while there was
admiration for Roman engineering, art, and literature, "one must
ask whether or not this habit of mind made any substantial
difference in the development of American law."16 Was civil law
used in the United States only for legal education, systematic
thinking and scholarly adornment, as argued by Dean Hoeflich and
Peter Stein who maintained that Roman law made no headway in
the courtroom as a working component of American jurisprudence?
Hemholz's view is that all "conclusions must be guarded." 7 It is an
"undisputable fact" that by statistical comparisons, civil law "was
not used with anything remotely approaching the frequency of use
8
of the English common law."'
11.
(1992).
12.

M. H. Hoeflich, Roman Law in American Legal Culture, 66 TUL L REv. 1723, 1743

ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAw (1991); REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, THE
LAW OF OBLIGATION: RoMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITIONS (1990); PETER STEIN, LEGAL
EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980).

13. Mathias Riemann, Stepping Out of the European Shadow: Why Comparative Law
in the United States Must Develop Its own Agenda, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 637, 643 (1998).
14. Id.
15. M. H. Hoeflich, Roman Law in American Legal Culture, 66 TUL L REV. 1723, 1743
(1992).
16. R. H. Hemholz, Use of Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American Jurisprudence,
66 TuL L REV. 1649, 1650-84 (1992). See also R.H. Hemholz, Continental Law and Common
Law: Historical Strangers or Companions? 1990 DUKE LJ. 1207 (1990).
17. Id.
18. Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-RevolutionaryAmerica, 52 VA.
L REV. 403-34 (1966). See also the numerous writings by Dean Hoeflich. Additionally, note

the conclusion of Kernir L Hall that "[tihe civil law tradition contributed only modestly to
the origins of American Law." KERMIR L HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR, LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY
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Any proper response to these assertions obviously must derive
from ransacking cases - in this article, those of the twentieth
century and for the moment limited to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The task of ferreting out actual references to
"Roman law" has been immensely simplified by merely putting the
term through the computer. The computer search for Supreme
Court cases turned up 140 case references between 1788 and 1999.
The present writing goes back only to the 1890's. There are several
hundred more cases in the inferior federal courts for the same
period. While this article does not address state cases, the
computer still has signified a very large number of cases for these
state jurisdictions, as for example for the author's home state of
Pennsylvania. If these cases are in turn Shepardized with other
states, the number of references rises considerably.
All this is to suggest that a great deal of tedious research
remains to be done by legal historians in this field. Unlike general
departments of history, most legal academics in law schools are
not blessed with numbers of graduate students who can be put to
the task of basic research. Yet, because of the case-bound nature of
American law, there is no alternative to detailed readings of cases
in an effort to match references to Roman law with court
decisions. Moreover, the only effective way of testing the real
applications of Roman law, thereby understanding its acceptance, is
to follow the same path of inquiry..
Nor is this approach totally new as to this time. In 1934, James
Mackintosh published a book that studied actual cases employing
Roman Law. 19 Four years later, William L. Burdick, Dean of the

University of Kansas Law School, published the

PRINCIPLES

OF

LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW. 20

Burdick's volume
was filled with references to Roman rules in American common
law cases. It must be noted, however, that Dean Burdick never
claimed that Roman law was binding precedent; he argued instead
that American courts had adopted Roman law via English feudal
law. Additionally, it is equally tantalizing to wonder how other
common law countries utilized Roman law in their court decisions.
ROMAN

103 (1989).
JAMES MACKINTOSH, ROMAN LAW IN MODERN PERSPECTIVE (1934).
20. Wm.W Gaunt, Inc., of Holmes Beach, Florida, reprinted Burdick's book in 1989.
See also Robert A. Kessler, On the Value of Roman Law for Twentieth Century American
Law Students, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377-95 (1960). Kansas, along with Louisiana, still tested on
Roman law on their bar examinations into the twentieth century. The bar admission rules are
in West Publishing Co. 1909.
19.
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In Canada, for example, the Supreme Court in 1928 relied on a long
line of common law precedents and the Digest to decide
unanimously that the British North America Act (1867) did not
mean "women" as "persons" eligible to serve in the Senate of
Canada. The decision was overruled in 1930.21
In this article, the presentation of the cases follows a slightly
modified chronological approach. Afterwards, there is an analysis
of the meanings that may be gathered from the cases.
II.

CASES

In 1999, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Alden v. Maine.22 The issue was whether state
sovereign immunity barred private suits under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.23 Under Article I of the Federal Constitution,
does Congress have the authority to abrogate a state's immunity
from suits in its own courts? Writing for the majority, in a case of
first impression, holding that a state is not immune, 24 Justice
William Kennedy's opinion is an extended examination of the
nature of the American Union. It is indeed a virtual history of the
Constitution, including references to English legal history,
Blackstone, Madison, Federalist No. 33, the meanings of the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments, and a number of federal cases as
precedent. In dissent, Justice David Souter determined that the
"Court's principal rationale for today's result, then, turns on
history."25 The dissent then also proceeded to engage in a review of
the subject of natural law and sovereign immunity, with inquiries
on Bracton, Pufendorf, Blackstone, Jean Bodin, Hobbes, and Sir
John Eliot. Justice Souter, however, additionally cited to Baldus de
Ubaldis and his commentary on the statute of Digna Vox in the
Digest and, as well, quoted Ulpian's famous statement in the Digest
26
that the emperor is not bound by statutes.
In assessing the relationship between civil and American

21. See, M. M. Goldsmith, Republican Liberty Considered, 21 Hisr. PoL THOUGHT, 544
n.4; see also the concept of usufruct: "so familiar in Roman law," was first used by the
Canadian Supreme Court in St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen [1887] 13
S.C.R. 577, 604 (Can.).
22. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
23. Id. at 712.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 768 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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common law in this case, it appears that the latter would have
been sufficient as a matter of precedent to decide the opinions. It
is equally clear, however, that both jurists, but especially Justice
Souter, was reaching for a broader wellspring of legal
understanding that would bring to bear on this thinking a sense of
Western historical development and integrity.
Decided in 1998, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority
opinion in Miller v. Albright,27 holding that persons born in the
United States, including illegitimate children, are citizens. 28 The
dissent by Justice Steven Breyer insisted that citizenship was
acquired principally by parentage. 29 Although the dissent followed
American case law in the main, Justice Breyer included a very
short reference to the basis of acquiring citizenship under Roman
law principally by parentage2 0 The vast remainder of the dissent, of
course, was based on American law that alone could have decided
the matter.
31
the issue involved
In Burnham v. Superior Court of California,
the Due Process Clause where a non-resident was personally
served with process while temporarily in California on a suit
unrelated to his activities in the state. 32 The only reference in
Justice White's concurrence to Roman law was a footnote to L.
Wenger, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to the
effect that under the ancient republic's rules, jurisdiction could be
acquired by forceY. Justice White was attempting to offer historical
comparisons on the subject with the full knowledge that the
Roman method of acquiring jurisdiction had disappeared in early
nineteenth century American law.
Justice William Brennan's concurring opinion devoted a lengthy
three-page analysis of English law. The two concurrences, in effect,
ran the historical continuum between Rome, through England, and
to American cases that formed the bulk of the precedent in the
case.
The issue addressed for the majority by Justice Antonin Scalia in
27. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
28. Id. at 442-43.
29. Id. at 476-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 477 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing E. de Vattel, THE LAW OF NArIONS 101-02 (J.
Chitty, trans. 1883) (1758), and A. Berger, 43 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAw 389
(1953)).
31. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
32. Id. at 607.
33. Id. at 631 n.3 (White, J., concurring).
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Coy v. Iowa,-" was whether the Sixth Amendment dictates a
face-to-face cross-examinations of child victims in molestation
cases. 35 In holding that such a requirement is found the
Constitution, Justice Scalia relied almost exclusively on American
law with a surprisingly brief comment on English law. As to Roman
law, however, he cited Christian scripture:
There are indications that a right of confrontation existed
under Roman law. The Roman Governor Festus discussing the
proper treatment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: "It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the
accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given
36
a chance to defend himself against the charges."
In Library of Congress v. Shaw,37 the problem was sovereign
immunity and the "no interest rule": no recovery can be had
"against the Government in the absence of an express waiver of
sovereign immunity from an award of interest."3 Justice Harry
Blackmun held for the government based on American precedent.
The only foreign law reference was the statement that the
"institution of interest under Roman law was a penalty due from a
9
debtor who delayed or defaulted in repayment of a loan."3
The case of Bowers v. Hardwick4° held that the Constitution
does not extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in
sodomy.41 With a brief review of English law, Chief Justice Warren
Burger's concurring opinion made reference to the Theodosian and
Justinian Codes to claim, "[hlomosexual sodomy was a capital
crime under Roman law."42 In dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun
pointedly replied that Judeo-Christian prohibitions are insufficient
as rules of law because they cannot give a state a right to impose
conformity as a secular coercive power. 43 In the aggregate,
however, the decision rested on American precedent.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma,44 Justice William Brennan determined
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1015-16 (quoting Acts 25:16).
478 U.S. 310 (1986).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 315 n.2.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 191.
Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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that the Commerce Clause was violated where an Oklahoma statute
prohibited the shipment to another state of minnow fish caught in
Oklahoma 45 Brennan's majority opinion overruled Greer v.
Connecticut.46 Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief
Justice Burger) insisted that Greer, which derived from Roman law,
47
should be upheld.
The issue in Hughes, was the ancient state ownership doctrine of
wild animals that had formed the basis of Justice Edward D.
White's majority opinion in Greer in 1895.48 Under that doctrine,
wild animals located within a state were the common property of
the state's citizens, and the state could act as a trustee exercising
common ownership. 49 Taking wild animals was not commerce at
all. It was precisely this nineteenth century "legal fiction" employed
by Greer that J. Brennan was rejecting in 1979: the commerce
clause should apply to all natural resources.
The earlier Greer case, however, is significant here because of its
extensive use of Roman, English and Continental law. Justice White
devoted over three pages at the beginning of the opinion to an
analysis of the Digest. Three additional pages each covered Salic
law, feudal law, French law, and comments on German, Italian, and
Austrian rules on the subject. Blackstone and English law were
covered in two pages. Coming last in the Greer opinion were a
large number of American case citations.
It should be fully appreciated that despite time differences both
Hughes and Greer were argued within the connected contexts of
Roman law and the modem meaning of the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution. By whatever measure, nevertheless, the interplay
revealed a fascinating use of Roman law by American jurists
seeking to interpret the founding document of the United States.
In the 1970's the Supreme Court handed down two opinions, both
of which used the precedent of an earlier case in 1895 that cited
Roman law to a rather extensive degree. The first of these cases
was Johnson v. Louisiana,5° where Justice Byron White's majority
opinion upheld a Louisiana statute allowing for less than a
unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases. 51 The statute did not
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 336-37.
161 U.S. 519 (1895).
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 339-41 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
Id. at 327.
Id.
406 U.S. 356 (1972).
Id. at 363.
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violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses for failing to
satisfy the reasonable doubt standard.5 2 The second case was
Taylor v. Kentucky.5 Justice Lewis F. Powell authored the decision
that held that a criminal court must instruct a jury on the
presumption of innocence under the Due Process clause.5
The two cases reaffirmed the much earlier decision of Coffin v.
United States,5 where Justice Edward White ruled that a defendant
in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The
facts in Coffin concerned charges of bank fraud where the trial
court did instruct the jury on the subject of reasonable doubt but
erred in not instructing on the presumption of innocence.5 7 In a
decision of fifteen printed pages, about three were devoted to
Roman law, with almost two additional pages referring to English
common law, Fortescue, Blackstone and Hale, including brief
mention of Deuteronomy, Sparta, and Athens. Justice Edward
White quoted from the Digest and the views of the Emperor Julian
on the subject: "If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the
innocent?"5 The rule of the Digest is that it is better to let the
guilty go free than to condemn an innocent man. In Justice White's
words, "[tIhe rule thus found in the Roman law was, along with
many other fundamental and humane maxims of that system,
preserved for mankind by the canon law."59 At the end of his
opinion, Justice Edward White concluded:
Whilst Rome and the Medievalists taught that wherever doubt
existed in a criminal case, acquittal must follow, the
expounders of the common law, in their devotion to human
liberty and individual rights, traced this doctrine of doubt to
its true origin, the presumption of innocence, and rested it
upon this enduring basis.60
Justice Powell's 1978 reaffirmation in Taylor of the Coffin
holding made no reference to foreign law. Neither Justice Brennan's
concurrence nor the dissents by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist
looked back to Coffin's use of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman law.
52. Id.
53. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
54. Id. at 490.
55. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
56. Id. at 453.
57. Id. at 450, 452-53.
58. Id. at 455.
59. Id.
60. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 460.
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Justice White, however, concluded that the use of Hebrew, Greek
and Roman law "suggests that the Court of the late 19th Century
would have held the States bound by the reasonable-doubt standard
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on
the assumption that the standard was essential to a civilized system
of criminal procedure." 6' These words reflected an intellectual
standard by which Justice White reached into Western legal history
in order to find a "civilized" principle of justice.
Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade 6 2 contains a
significant amount of research on the history of the Hippocratic
Oath, Roman law, English common and statutory law, and an
extended examination of American law. Much of the research, of
course, bears on the issue of privacy. Regarding Roman law, Justice
Blackmun noted that "Greek and Roman law afforded little
protection to the unborn" as evidenced by "Rome's prevailing
free-abortion practices." 0 Neither dissents by Justices White and
Rehnquist strayed from the corpus of strictly American law.
In Labine v. Vincent,0 the issue was whether a Louisiana statute,
which barred illegitimate children from sharing in the father's
estate where the father had publicly acknowledged the child but
had died intestate, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 5 Justice Black's majority opinion decided
that the state statute did not offend the Constitution. 0 Reference to
Roman law was limited to a brief notation in Justice Breiman's
dissent, noting that those countries that had received the Roman
law, like Louisiana, had special rules on the father's place and
67
power in the family.
Parker v. Ellis,68 was a per curiam opinion in which the Court
dismissed Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus for want of jurisdiction
after the case became moot.69 Chief Justice Warren's dissenting
opinion would have granted Petitioner relief against wrongful
detention based squarely on American law. 70 The Chief Justice also
referred to the Magna Carta, and further concluded that habeas
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 360 n.2.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 130.
401 U.S. 532 (1971).
Id. at 533.
Id. at 539A0.
Id. at 545 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
362 U.S. 574 (1960).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 582-83 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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corpus was a rule "with an ancestry reaching back to Roman law."7'
Justice Felix Frankfurter authored the majority opinion in
Bartkus v. Illinois.72 The issue was whether the Due Process
Clause had been violated where a defendant had been acquitted in
a federal trial for bank robbery but then was tried by a state court
for the same crime. 73 The majority ruled that no violation had
occurred on the basis of both American law and earlier English
decisions. Justice Hugo Black dissented. In objecting to a second
trial, he underscored the fact that one of the oldest ideas in
Western Civilization is a bar against trying a person twice for the
same crime. 74 This statement was supported by a footnote that
cited the Digest; Max Radin, ROMAN LAw; John Phineas Sherman,
ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD; Christian writers such as St.
75
Jerome, and English jurists Bracton and Blackstone.
In the case of Reid v. Covert,76 Claire Covert killed her husband
on a United States military base in England.7 7 The issue was
whether the Bill of Rights applied to a military courts-martial acting
on American citizens abroad. 78 Justice Hugo Black's opinion
concluded that the Bill of Rights did apply in such cases. 79 The
opinion, while based on numerous American cases, nevertheless
analyzed English legal history during the Stuart period and
pointedly referred to Lord Chief Justice Hale and Blackstone as
"men who exerted considerable influence on the Founders."80
Justice Black further reminded the Court that as to a fair trial
under American laws the right "is as old as government. It was
recognized long before Paul successfully invoked his right as a
81
Roman citizen to be tried in strict accordance with Roman law."
Quoting former Secretary of State James G. Blaine, Justice Black
underscored the belief that powers granted to overseas consulars
were "greater than ever the Roman law conferred on the
pro-consuls of the empire, to an officer who, under the terms of
the commitment of this astounding trust is practically
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 583.
359 U.S. 121 (1959).
Id. at 121-24.
Id. at 151 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 152 n.3 (Black J., dissenting).
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 26.
Reid, 354 U.S. at 6.
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irresponsible."8 2
The decision in UUman v. United States,"' upheld a contempt
sentence for a person who had refused to testify before a grand
jury regarding his activities in the Communist Party.84 Justice Felix
Frankfurter, relying exclusively on American law, wrote the
majority opinion. Justice William 0. Douglas dissented, however,
referring to Beccaria's ideas on crime and punishment, and added
teachings from French and English law. As for Roman law, Justice
Douglas wrote that the "penalties that Roman law attached to
infamy are familiar: exclusion from the army, from all public
service, and from the exercise of certain public rights.""' A prison
sentence was not included in the punishment.
Justice Robert A. Jackson wrote the majority opinion in MuUane
v. Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,86 considering the issue of the type
of notice required to be given to beneficiaries on a judicial
settlement of accounts by a trustee.8 7 The opinion held that
personal service shall be given to known persons.88 In his analysis,
Justice Jackson included in the text a discussion of the distinctions
between actions in rem and in personam in the area of substantive
property law that was much different in ancient times8 For
authority, he cited to Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and
Common Law, and Burdick Principles of Roman Law and Their
Relation to Modem Law ° There were no references in the opinion
to either civil law or English law. The bulk of precedent used in the
case, of course, was the law of the United States.
In Krulewitch v. United States,91 the issue was whether a
co-conspirator's statement made after the conspiracy ended was
still admissible. 92 In the concurring opinion by Justice Robert A.
Jackson, the more general issue of conspiracy was discussed.
Justice Jackson wrote that conspiracy was not favored by civil law
countries as well as England and had been invented by the Court
82.

Id. at 11 n.16.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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92.

350 U.S. 422 (1956).
Id. at 429, 439.
Id. at 451 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 312.
Id.
336 U.S. 440 (1949).
Id. at 441-42.
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of the Star Chamber.93 In a footnote, Justice Jackson noted that
conspiracy "is utterly unknown to the Roman law; it is not found in
modem Continental codes."94
Justice William 0. Douglas wrote for the majority in Deputy v.
du Pont.95 The Supreme Court here, however, rejected rather than
utilized a Roman rule. The chief issue was an interpretation
regarding stockholder's income under the Revenue Act of 1928 and
96
the specific meaning of the words "interest" and "indebtedness."
Justice Douglas rejected the respondent's argument as being based
on "some esoteric concept derived from subtle and theoretic
analysis." 97 Du Pont, in fact, had used the Roman concept of the
mutuum culled from Ledlie Sohm, INsTrruTEs OF ROMAN LAw, to
make his point. 98 Justice Douglas rejected this ancient view in favor
of well-known contemporary meanings.9
In 1937, Justice Benjamin Cardozo authored the majority opinion
in Palko v. Connecticut,'00 which held there was no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment when a state takes an appeal in criminal
cases where a statute permits a judge to allow the appeal.10' The
decision revolved around American law, but Justice Cardozo's third
footnote referred to Bentham on punishment and noted that
compulsory self-incrimination was the established procedure in

Europe, as found in Sherman, ROMAN

LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD,

02
and French sources as well.
In the same year, Justice Cardozo also wrote the opinion in Van
Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 0 3 but on this opinion made greater
use of Roman law. The facts of the case concerned a seaman who
had been killed because of his employer's negligence. 1°4 The
seaman's mother sued for damages but died during the pendency of
her suit. 0 5 The issue was whether the executrix's suit abated or
continued after her death. °6 Justice Cardozo first turned to Roman

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 450 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 450 n.14 (Jackson, J., concurring).
308 U.S. 488 (1940).
Id. at 498.
Id. (quoting Old Colony R. Co. v. Con'r, 284 U.S. 552, 561 (1932)).
Id. at 498 n.10.
Id. at 498.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Id. at 320-21, 328.
Id. at 326 n.3.
300 U.S. 342 (1937).
Id. at 343.
Id.
Id.
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law where he found the principle that "no action of an essentially
penal character could be commenced after the death of the person
responsible for the injury. "1°7 According to the Digest, vengeance
was not "to reach beyond the grave." l 08
Here is an instance of how the Supreme Court traced the
changes in Roman law by the common law. Justice Cordozo had
gleaned his analysis from such English historians as Fifoot and
Holdsworth. 109
In Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island, and Pacific Ry. Co.,1O Justice George Sutherland
undertook art extensive historical inquiry into the origins of
American bankruptcy law in addressing the issue of how to
reorganize an insolvent interstate railroad. His only reference to
Roman law was the observation that the bankruptcy law in force in
England, at the time the Constitution was adopted in America,
actually originated in the Roman law."' No citations were listed for
this point.
Justice Pierce Butler wrote for the majority in Pobreslo v. Joseph
M. Boyd Co.," 2 where the issue was whether voluntary assignments
for the benefit of creditors was consistent with a federal statute,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1933.113 Counsel for appellant referred to
Max Radin's HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAw to argue that the Romans
impounded a debtor's property, provided for equitable distribution
among creditors, and imposed penalties for fraud by the debtor but
had no provision for discharge as found in modem legal systems.
Nevertheless, the Roman doctrine was not discussed in the text of
the case, which focused on a broader discussion of bankruptcy.
The outcome of the case, in reality, was rooted directly in
American law that alone resolved the issues.
In his various careers, Oliver Wendell Holmes made references to
Roman law in several instances. Holmes, of course, was unique
among all of the justices who have served on the state and federal
supreme courts in that he was by far the most knowledgeable
student of Roman law. In the early 1870's, when Holmes first
107. Id. at 344-45, 345 n.4 (citing W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEBooK OF ROMAN
BUCKIAND AND McNAIR, ROMAN AND COMMON LAw).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Van Beeck, 300 U.S. at 345 n.5.
Id. at 345 nn.4-6, 8, 10-11.
294 U.S. 648 (1935).
Id. at 674.
287 U.S. 518 (1933).
Id. at 521.
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delved into legal history, he became deeply interested in Roman
law. He quickly came to question the value of the study of Roman
law for American practitioners because he believed that whereas
the common law, Teutonic in origin, begins and ends with
particular cases, the civil law followed general principles, and he
feared contamination by the latter. American law students should
not study Ulpian but rather better study in a law office. What
repelled Holmes in a special way was the Germanic influence in
Roman law based on the Hegelian and Kantian presuppositions
reflected by German Pandectenwissenshaft. As applied to American
legal scholarship, Holmes was also directing his ire at the dean of
the Harvard Law School, Christopher Columbus Langdell, who
"represents the powers of darkness." 114
According to Mark DeWolfe Howe, these views had been formed
in the 1870's. In 1897, however, Holmes published his famous essay,
"The Path of the Law" where he noted that as a young man he had
been given "unreal" advice "and among the unrealities I place the
recommendation to study the Roman law."11 5 If the advice simply
meant to collect Latin maxims "to ornament the discourse," that
was understandable. Otherwise, there was little value to be gained
from a Roman legal system that had degenerated into philosophical
and scientific generalities that bore little relationship to practical
16
everyday "felt necessities."
Still, Holmes did not hesitate to employ Roman law throughout
his careers as a private practitioner, state court judge, and member
of the United States Supreme Court. In 1877 he appeared as
114.

The basic analysis of Holmes' views of Roman law that has been followed by

subsequent writers is MARK DEWOLFE HOwE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES; VOL n1: THE

PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882, 92-93, 151, 157 (1963); see also Mathias Reimann, Holmes'
Common Law and German Legal Science, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 72
(Robert W. Gordan ed., 1992); Michele Graziadei, Changing Images of the Law in XIX
Century English Legal Thought, in MATmAS REIMANN, THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN
THE COMMON LAw WORLD 150 n.179 (1993); JOHN HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970,
42 (1990).
115. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REV. 457, 475 (1897).
116. Id. Among Holmes' numerous contributions to the American Law Review in the
1870's was an article entitled "Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law" in which he traced
the legal history from Roman times of the disqualification of "deaf and dumb" persons from
making contracts. Holmes took note of the fact that between Justinian's Institutes and
English text writers, the rule had been misinterpreted. Holmes took away from this the
warning that a developing rule can be properly understood only by "knowing the course of
its development." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law 5 Am. L
REv. 1 (1870); this story is related in IA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 212-13 (1991). Baker concludes: "He had no doubts about

the role of historical forces in legal development." Id. at 212.
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17 a case involving a
attorney for the defense in Temple v. Thrner,"
question of agency where a seaman had sued the master of a ship
rather than the owners for wages."' Holmes argued at the outset
that there was no evidence the plaintiff had even served on the
vessel.11 9 As to the agency issue, Holmes' argument to the trial
court began with a paragraph from the Digest seeking to define
mandatum as to whether the master of a vessel binds the owner to
20
a contract, followed by an analysis of agency in medieval law.'
Holmes was, in fact, tracing the history of agency principles.
As a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Holmes continued to refer to ancient rules. In 1891 he again
addressed principles of agency in Dempsey v. Chambers.'2' A
delivery of coal had been made to a homeowner.'2 The delivery
somehow had been made without the knowledge or authorization
of the coal company, but the deliveryman negligently broke one of
the homeowner's windows."2 When the coal company later learned
of the shipment of its coal, it demanded payment from the
homeowner who then in turn sued the coal company on an agency
theory for the cost of the broken window.124 The issue was whether
the coal company was liable because it had ratified the delivery by
25
sending a bill.'
Holmes reached back to the Digest and principle of ratio habito
mandato comparatur (ratification is equal to command) and found
the company liable for the trespass.'216 The demand for payment
was a ratification that made the master answerable. Holmes added,
as usual, an analysis of English law found in Lord Coke's
Institutes.' 27 Once again, Holmes showed his mastery of legal
history by tracing Roman legal doctrine through its meaning in
English common law and application to an American problem.
In the 1899 case of Aslanian v. Dostumian,128 Holmes made a
very cursory inquiry into the question of whether Roman or

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

123 Mass. 125 (1877).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 125.
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28 N.E. 279 (Mass. 1891).
Id. at 331.
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Id.
Id.
Dempsey, 28 N.E. at 333.
Id.
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Frankish law applied to a debt on a draft payable in Turkey.' 29 Very
little was said about Roman law. In 1890, Holmes wrote the
majority opinion in Harmon v. Osgood,130 on the issue of whether a
creditor could reach a decedent's assets willed to a trustee as a
donatio causa mortis. 31 Holmes stnmg together Massachusetts's
statutory law, American common law, as well as Roman law to
hold that an action could lie against a trustee. The reference to
Roman law was again brief and devoid of almost any further
comment.
After he succeeded to the United States Supreme Court, Holmes
almost totally ignored Roman law. The one major exception was
the subject of determining title to land gained by accretion when
the flow of water receded. He first addressed this problem in
3
writing for the majority in the case of Ker & Co. v. Couden,11
which originated in the Philippine Islands. The petitioner's
argument was that under the Justinian Code, accretions from the
sea belong to the owners of the bank. Holmes agreed that under a
rule of Gaius, the land indeed went to that owner. But he quickly
added: "If this is to be taken as an example illustrating a general
principle there is an end of the matter. But the Roman law is not
like a deed or a modem code prepared uno flatu." 13 By contrast,
argued Holmes, a gloss of Accursius would lead to a different
result. "And to illustrate a little further the uncertainty as to the
Roman doctrine," Donellus held that "the Institutes [are] peculiar to
rivers." 34 Holmes then turned to the Code Napolean, the Philippine
civil Code, the Civil Codes of Chile and Louisiana, and finally the
Spanish Law of Waters to hold that the land belongs to the
sovereign.135
The issue reappeared in Stevens v. Arnold.'36 Writing for the
majority, Holmes rested his decision on the prior ruling in Ker.'3 7
Once again, nevertheless, he undertook an analysis of Roman law
129. Id. at 846.
130. 24 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1890).
131. Id. at 502.
132. 223 U.S. 268 (1912).
133. Id. at 276.
134. Id. at 276-77.
135. Id. at 277-79. Gaius lived in the second century A-D. and his Institutes chronicled
much of Roman law; Hugo Doneau (Donellus, 1527-1591) was a teacher and writer on
Roman law and the French University of Bourges. Accursius taught at the University of
Bologna in the thirteenth century as part of the "Glossators."
136. 262 U.S. 266 (1923).
137. Id. at 270.
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and subsequent civil law to demonstrate his mastery of the
intricacies that marked the development and differing applications
of the ancient laws of Rome.
The other major reference by Justice Holmes to Roman sources
was his majority opinion in Ubarri v. Laborde.3 8 The case dealt
with the laws of Puerto Rico where the question was whether an
heir who waived the benefit of an inventory could make him
personally liable for the debts of the succession without limits.'3
Holmes appears to have relied rather heavily on Roman law, which
taught that the effect of the waiver was indeed to make the heir
personally liable without limit.' 40 To support his historical analysis,
Holmes noted that the same result would obtain under English law
(Glanville) as well as French law.14' Beyond Ker, Stevens, and
42
Ubarri, Justice Holmes did nothing else with Roman law.
The subject of riparian rights was decided in the case of Cubbins
v. Mississippi River Commission.'3 The specific issue was
whether an owner of a riverbank could interrupt the natural flow
of water'4 The majority opinion by Chief Justice Edward D. White
was intriguing in that over three pages were devoted to an analysis
of Roman law, general European law, and the Code Napolean.
Under Roman law, the flow could not be interrupted except in
cases of extraordinary floods or accidents. 45 The Roman law was
further examined as the basis of French and Scottish laws on this
subject. 46 Although very few American cases were cited, it does
appear in the final analysis that the decision preventing the
interruption of the natural flow was based on American cases.
Without doubt, in any case, the decision demonstrated the use of
historical inquiry in deciding law.
Justice James Clark McReynolds wrote for a unanimous court in
Butler v. Perry,147 upholding a Florida statute that required all
able-bodied men to work for six days each year without pay to
138.
139.

214 U.S. 168 (1909).
Id. at 172-73.

140.

Id. at 172.

141. Id.
142. In Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170, 171 (1923), Holmes made a brief reference to
the laws of those nations "that inherit Roman law." In Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91, 93
(1905) Holmes referred very briefly to a maxim of Gaius, "Bonorum emptor ficto se herede
agit."
143. 241 U.S. 351 (1916).
144. Id. at 360-61.
145. Id. at 363.
146. Id. at 365-66.
147. 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
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repair roads and bridges in their own counties.148 The decision
rested mainly on American cases, but also traced the law of such
obligation from Roman law to Blackstone where it was known as
49
the trinoda necessitas.'
The case of Langpre v. Diaz,'5° came out of Puerto Rico and
decided that a person who purchases a minor's property by private
agreement is a possessor in bad faith. 51 In reaching his decision,
Chief Justice Edward White undertook an examination of the
historical roots of Puerto Rican law. This in turn involved a
discussion of over three pages of Spanish law and the Code
Napoleon, leading to the conclusion that the latter had been highly
influenced by the writings perhaps the greatest Roman lawyer,
Mucius Quintus Scaevola (d. 82 B.C.). 152 The comparatively long
historical inquiry into foreign law leaves a clear impression that
Chief Justice White was not only cognizant of this background, but
also gave it some weight in reaching his understanding of the law
of the case.
In Weems v. United States,'5 the majority opinion of Justice
Joseph McKenna dealt with the recurring issue of cruel and
unusual punishment where a fifteen-year sentence was meted out
for falsification of a government document.'5 While the sentence
was set aside, the dissent of Justice Edward White condemned
Roman punishment by comparison: "By the roman law a parricide
was punished by being sewed up in a leather sack with a live dog,
a cock, a viper, and an ape, and cast into the sea."5 5 Justice White
thereby was making one of many comparisons demonstrating cruel
and unusual punishment.
The issue of whether Puerto Rico could exercise jurisdiction over
a claim of property by the Roman Catholic Church was decided by
the majority opinion of Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller in Ponce v.
Roman CatholicApostolic Church.'5 The case is interesting in that
very few American cases were cited. Instead, the opinion was a
tour around the history of the Church, including papal bulls, in
Spain and the Indies. Several references were made to ancient
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 329-30, 333.
Id. at 331.
237 U.S. 512 (1915).
Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 524.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. at 357-59.
Id. at 406 (White, J., dissenting).
210 U.S. 296 (1908).

2002

Roman Law in American Law

Spanish law and the writings of Pollock and Maitland on English
ecclesiastical law. The opinion pointed out that according to the
Justinian Code, the Emperor Constantine bestowed a corporate
personality on Church property.'57 Under the "axiom of the heathen
Papinian," the local churches succeeded to the sanctity that ancient
law had given to temples. 158 Church ground remained hallowed
after destruction of the temples. Puerto Rico, therefore, had no
jurisdiction in these cases.
The case of Romeu v. Todd'59 dealt with the issue of a bona fide
purchaser in a suit brought to change the recorded title over to the
name of the real owner.' 6° In characterizing the action, Justice
Edward White wrote that "[i]n the very nature of things, under the
civil law, the cause of action thus asserted was not merely
revocatory (The Actio Pauliana of the Roman law), but was an
action to unmask a simulation."'1'
In a case out of Pennsylvania, Cunnius v. Reading School
District,16' the Supreme Court dealt with an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the issue of the reasonableness of a
state statute that provided for the administration of assets of an
absentee presumed to be dead.'1' Written by Justice Edward White,
the case referred to a small number of American state cases. On
the other hand, the opinion freely cited to the Code Napolean, the
writings of Domat, and Roman law. It may be accurate to conclude
that the civil law sources were the key to the decision. In
employing Roman law, White's opinion stated:
Whilst it may be that under the Roman law there was no
complete and coherent system provided for the administration
of the estate of an absentee ... it is nevertheless certain that
absence, without being heard from for a given length of time,
authorized the appointment of a curator to protect and
administer an estate.114
Justice White also made a brief reference to Roman law and the
Code Napolean in City of San Juan v. St. Johns Gas Co.,'65 holding
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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that the character of money (greenbacks or gold) for purposes of
contract law, absent an agreement, is determined by the character
current at the time of performance, not at the time of the making
of the agreement. 1 6 The rule, well known in American case law,
167
ultimately derived from the Roman law.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court, with
Justice Joseph McKenna authoring the opinions, took up the issue
of adverse possession in the state of New Mexico. The first case
was United States v. Chavez.l6 The specific problem was whether
Mexican law contained the rule of adverse possession prior to the
cession of 1848 and, thus, whether the rule carried over to
statehood. 169 Chavez held that the principle of adverse possession
came from "general jurisprudence, and is recognized in the Roman
law and the codes founded thereon."'70 While the opinion referred
to a very few American cases, Roman law appears to have been the
basic principle directing the conclusion. Chavez was then used as
the precedent in United States v. Pendell,'71 although in this
instance the court rested its opinion to a large degree on American
cases that had been developed.
Justice Edward D. White's opinion in Knowlton v. Moore 72 was
an insightful survey of Western legal history on the subject of death
taxes. It covered ancient French law, ancient German law, and
nearly two pages on English law. As to Roman law, the court
concluded that "[death] taxes so considered were known to the
Roman law and the ancient law of the continent of Europe."' 73
Despite the use of historical sources, however, the case was firmly
rooted on American precedents.
Another interesting example of the way in which the Supreme
Court relied mainly on Roman law is Oakes v. United States.'7 4 The
case concerned the Federal confiscation of a steamboat owned by
a Confederate during the American Civil War. 75 The vessel had
been converted to a gunboat. 76 Under a special act of Congress,
166.
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170.
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July 28, 1892, Oakes sought compensation in the Court of Claims to
which Congress had given jurisdiction to hear such cases. 177 In an
opinion by Justice Horace Gray, the Supreme Court, although
referring to a few American cases, drew its conclusion that Oakes
had to be compensated on the basis of the Roman jus
postliminii.178 The Roman rule held that things taken by the enemy
had to be restored to the former owner when he again comes
under the power of the nation where he had been a citizen or
subject. 179 The law derived from the Roman view that it was the
duty of a sovereign to protect citizens and their property.1 80 In
further analysis, Justice Gray traced the rule to Vattel's work on
18
international law and the English Prize Acts. '
With similar emphasis on Roman law, Justice Edward D. White
held in a case of title to land gained from the Mexican cession,
Hayes v. United States,182 that the Spanish law of the Siete
Partidas, the Code Napoleon, and the Louisiana Code all derived
from Roman law.'83 In this particular case, Roman law held that a
person who lacked title could not convey title even by
prescription. 184 Quoting from Roman legal history, Justice White
concluded that while Roman authorities often differed on various
subjects, they all agreed that void title is no title. 185
Justice Horace Gray wrote the controlling opinion in United
States v. Wong Kim Ark,186 deciding that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a child born in the United States of non-citizen
parents is a citizen of the United States. 8 7 In support of his
conclusion, Justice Gray undertook a five-page analysis of English
common law, especially Blackstone, as a basis of understanding the
American Constitution. He also utilized several American and
French cases but added a discussion of the Roman law principle
that, to the contrary, adhered to jus sanguinis (citizenship
followed the country of descent or blood rather than jus soli, the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 785.
Id. at 793.
Oakes, 174 U.S. at 792.
Id. at 792-93.
Id.
170 U.S. 637 (1898).
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
169 U.S. 649 (1898).
Id. at 702.
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country of birth).1 8 Justice Gray noted, however, that English law
did not follow the Roman rule at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution in 1789.189
III.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Based on the above survey, several very preliminary conclusions
follow the American Supreme Court's writings about Roman law in
the twentieth century. First, in the period of approximately one
hundred years, such references have appeared in an admittedly
small number of cases. Compared to the total number of decisions
handed down by the Court, the use of Roman legal sources has
been infrequent.
Second, despite the infrequency of use, the nature and quality of
these references raises intriguing questions for the legal historian
who, in the final analysis, must confront the problem of what in the
world are justices of the Supreme Court doing by referencing the
ancient rules as well as histories of Roman law in their decisions.
In some sense, of course, it may be argued that such usage merely
affirmed Holmes' observation that the purpose was pure
ornamentation. This view could be read in to those cases where
Roman law was a mere appendage to a much broader marshalling
of American decisions. On the other hand, in some instances, it is
clear that the opinions seemed to be reaching for Roman law as a
possible accumulation of authority, or even as gap fillers, or indeed
as precedent in rare cases involving the lands acquired by
expansion, particularly from the Philippines and Puerto Rico, where
it was necessary to decide the content of legal rules in effect at the
time of conquest. And then there is the somewhat strange analyses
of Holmes himself whose opinions in Ker, Stevens, and Ubarri
were based to a large extent on Roman law, in contrast to his fussy
strictures about using the ancient rules.
Third, in attempting to respond to the question of why certain
justices used Roman law, on the other hand, it is important to
understand that a reading of these opinions inevitably generates a
feeling that the justices perhaps were engaged in a search for
historical pedigree, if not historical precedent, in some cases. The

188.
189.

Id. at 666.
Id.

2002

Roman Law in American Law

magnetic pull of historical imprimatur seems to have convinced
them to inform their conclusions with a sense of legal feel for the
Western legal tradition. Seen in this light, perhaps it is not
unreasonable to find these decisions sprinkled with references to
the names of modem historians of the Roman legal system:
Sherman, Max Radin, Buckland, McNair, Pound and others.
Donald R. Kelley reminds us in regard to the "juriconsults" that:
They spoke (and still speak) to one another over many
centuries and across national boundaries, invoking not only
their intellectual forebearers but also their posterity - not
only their "pre-cursors," but also their "post cursors." From the
Greek orators and Roman honoratiores to modem legal and
social "scientists," certain assumptions, terms, concepts,
authorities, "prejudices," and larger intellectual conventions
have been preserved, developed, and modified in various ways
which must be understood beyond, as well as within, specific
historical contexts. 19°
Alan Watson's latest expanded study of legal evolution
underscores two additional important facets of the evolutionary
tradition:
First, the weight of authority of a foreign system has come to
be the course that is to be turned to in time of need. Even if
the law is unclear and inappropriate, even if the system is
seldom expressly referred to, still it is there. Second, the
impact of the past on present law is enormous even when past
law has changed its influence continues. 9 1
In Watson's view, there is another universal trait in the
development of law, borrowing law from other sources is often the
most fruitful method by which law develops. 192 In sum, according
to these scholars, jurists speak to each other across the ages, while
subsequent legal changes derive from borrowing the past.
Is the sample of cases compiled here so thin that such broad
generalizations cannot be tested with any sense of accuracy
regarding the Court's use of legal history in its decisions? That
clearly seems to be the case, since at most the opinions may be no
more than suggestive at this point regarding the historical value of
190. DONALD R. KELLEY,
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Roman law to the Court. Further research in nineteenth century
Supreme Court opinions will uncover many more Roman citations,
for example, in the famous decisions of Ex parte Milligan,19' Scott
v. Sandford,14 Sturges v. Crowninshield,95 and McCulloch v.
196
Maryland.
Numerous federal circuit court opinions in these two centuries
offer fertile ground for further research into the use of Roman law,
with additional references to the more recent works of H. F
Jolowicz, Watson, 97 and Barry Nicholas. 198 There may be at least
hundreds of state cases, moreover, that to some degree include
Roman legal sources. Taken in the aggregate, the opinions of all
American courts using Roman law probably would far surpass
present suspicions about their existence and perhaps lead to new
evaluations concerning the influence of Roman jurisprudence on
American legal doctrines. The small band of American legal
academics that preached the gospel of such influence surely would
have been pleased with such information, if only they had had a
computer filled by Lexis and Westlaw.
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